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Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0

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Cy # 78, 7 Pgs

8 Sep 76

MEMORANDUM FOR

Subject: Selected Presentations of the 26 May Security Meeting

1. Attached for your review are three presentations delivered during the 26 May Security Meeting in Los Angeles. Included are the text of General Kulpa's opening remarks, [redacted] speech on the role of the Special Security Center, and the essence of [redacted] remarks on the NRO and changes in the intelligence community.

2. Please take this opportunity to formally rebrief all of your [redacted] personnel using the material contained in this package. Even though some of the data is perishable it can serve as an outstanding "Refresher Course" for your people. The level of information is [redacted] and should be tailored by each [redacted] security officer to company unique circumstances.

3. After you have had sufficient time to review the materials, I would welcome any comments or questions you may have. Also, please advise me when you have completed your rebriefing efforts.

3 Atch
a/s

NRO review(s)
completed.

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WELCOMING/KEYNOTE COMMENTS
BY MAJ GEN JOHN E. KULPA

*Attn, cy 46,
33 pgs*

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As you can see I have been associated with satellite reconnaissance for a long time and, as such, have a great feeling of identity with [] security and the group meeting here. I know that, in addition to the [] Security Officers, a key member of [] program management is representing each company. I know you are all busy people. I appreciate this representation and think it is necessary to achieve the goals of this meeting.

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1. The mission of the Special Projects organization is to develop and operate reconnaissance satellites, return the data to earth and deliver it to the processing center.

Intelligence collection and security are intertwined. A successful intelligence collection system, in order to remain useful, must be secure. In the case of satellites, it is a particularly hard job keeping satellite systems secure, because satellites are fragile, operate in the open environment of space and can be the target of political complaints from countries who feel their privacy rights are being invaded. Further, launches can't be hidden and satellites can be tracked and traced. For those reasons, which make security both difficult and important, we have tried to keep a close interlock between management of the systems and security.

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Thus far, there has been reasonably good success in keeping the subject of satellite reconnaissance out of international and national debates. There has been no systemitized challenge, as to the legitimacy of the operation. The constraining of discussion of satellites for reconnaissance is now DOD SECRET, more change may come. That is, there may be in the future, from time to time, official acknowledgements of satellite reconnaissance by Government officials. If this occurs, we believe there will be little real effect on day-to-day security, associations, capabilities, missions, plans and operations.

Protecting the details of technologies, capabilities, methods, sources, logistics, industrial potential in the operations of reconnaissance satellites will, I perceive, remain in the [] system and be our challenge to keep secure.

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2. Let me talk about a new approach that will offer interesting [] security challenges.

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Until now, the assets and resources of reconnaissance satellites have been devoted to fulfill the national mandate

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25X1A and covert relationships. However, in no case should any individual with a [] clearance act against his conscience. The means, as well as the ends of our job are and will remain absolutely legal and ethical. We can secure our systems and be honest, in fact, honesty and security go together.

Let me be blunt, there is nothing wrong in keeping our mouths shut.

I also want to again re-emphasize the need to avoid any conflict of interest situations. SAFSP personnel will not accept any gratuity and I ask your cooperation in avoiding embarrassing situations.

The subject of ethics is very close to the whole phenomenon of management responsibility in the changing social environment. Even before Watergate, the advent of OSHA, Freedom of Information Law and EEO had its impact on management in both Government and industry. These social changes are important and healthy for our society but they do cause additional considerations in managing [] security. Later in the day more attention will be given to social issues.

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5X1A 3. About day to day security - You are well aware that
25X1A we have avoided a rigid compliance security program. We
do not have an SAFSP [] security representative in
your plant. We look to you to carry out the mandate of
conducting [] security. Generally, over the years,
you have done a good job, and I understand the often
difficult position you may be in when the goals of manage-
ment appear to be inhibited by [] constraints. My 25X1A
Deputy Directors and I appreciate the outstanding accom-
25X1A plishments of [] security over the years that could
not have been achieved without a lot of hard work and
25X1A sacrifice by the [] security officers.

The reason for this meeting, however, is that I see
symptoms that suggest a loss of vitality. TOP SECRET
material has been lost on the streets. [] information 25X1A
25X1A is popping up in non-[] even unclassified, documents.
I have just reviewed a report of a briefed-individual
describing a program mission to an uncleared person. These
and other examples of concern will be discussed in more
detail later in the day.

You, the people in this room, are the binding force for
our programs. I do not have as much of an opportunity as

I would like to talk to you either individually, or in groups, about the importance of our security program. What we hope to achieve by our meeting today, is a better understanding by those of you in management positions so that you can fulfill your responsibility in assuring the protection of information vital to continued successful intelligence collection by satellite.

I thank you for your assistance in the past and encourage you to the challenges of the future.

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PRESENTATION

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Special Security Center (SSC), CIA - Our job is to coordinate security on the compartmented systems in general in cooperation with the USIB committees, which are now rechristened, instead of USIB, NFIB. Everything is changing. That's sort of the theme of what I'm going to talk to you about today. The SSC, for example, is the primary source of security policy for the NRO. In my previous position as the NRO staff security officer, I was detailed there by the Special Security Center. And so we do have a policy role and some of you may wonder, well good grief, why don't they formulate some better policy than they have in the past. The truth is that years ago only the NRO, the intelligence community and the Russians knew much about our reconnaissance efforts and security policy was relatively easy to make and simple to follow.

But things are now much more complicated, for many reasons. The product, as General Kulpa said, is invaluable and, as he also indicated, it's going to a lot more places than it used to, like the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the Department of Commerce. In order for the tax payer to get his buck's worth out of that reconnaissance effort, that product has to be spread around, and it's very

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useful. People do find it extremely useful. The result is that more people than ever are receiving satellite collected intelligence.

Another factor is disclosures about these programs - first Aviation Week and Jack Anderson, and then Seymore Hirsh, and then Marcetti and Marks, and more recently Phil Agee, the former CIA officer who, although not legally labeled so, from an ideological standpoint is in fact a defector. And Agee isn't finished yet. Last week, just before I left to come out here, I was told that he had managed to dredge up 200 more names of people he had been associated with when he was a Central Intelligence Agency officer and disclosed those as well. The man has undergone a total ideological change.

And then there were the SALT negotiations where we heard about national technical means of verification. That's a nice euphemism but it adds up to another admission of fact of. There was the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee, the House Committee on Intelligence. In all of these, both through leaks and through official disclosures, revealed a great deal about the overhead reconnaissance

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effort and intelligence in general. And there's sort of a rising, a lack of agreement among the intelligence community regarding how much should be revealed publicly regarding our reconnaissance efforts, and friends, it isn't easy to formulate security policy. It's always been hard to maintain a secret, but it gets harder all the time. But we, those of us in the National Reconnaissance Organization, have kept a lot of secrets over the years. And we will have to analyze motivation to understand why, not only why people disclose information that damages our intelligence effort, but why some people are willing to undergo the inconvenience, the extra work and the anonymity that are necessary to protect those efforts.

Those who leak secrets from the inside have their own motives - revenge against an institution which has failed to recognize and reward their peculiar genius; ideology, a misguided notion that abolishing secrecy will assure world peace and a better life for everybody; fame and notariety. This sort of thing. And finally of course, I suspect the most significant motive of all, financial gain.

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But we have our own motivations, those of us in this room. We have our own rewards, some of them in the form of what was popularly called a few years ago "psychic income." We have patriotism, knowing that we have contributed to the defense posture of the United States in a unique and irreplaceable way. We have pride in the skill and genius which have gone into the production of intelligence collection systems which, even today, makes some of Jules Vernes' most imaginative stories seem pale by comparison.

To be absolutely objective, of course, financial gain enters into it for us, too. The United States aerospace industry has grown and prospered through participation in the National Reconnaissance Program. Not only do these facts add up to a situation in which security policy is increasingly difficult to formulate and virtually impossible to enforce without the single minded cooperation and support of every man and woman in this room. And without the absolute support of the management of each contractor represented here. And some of us might find it confusing, irritating, even embarrassing, to read in the newspapers information that relates to programs we are restrained by security from discussing. Does it irritate you? Sure it does. You wouldn't be human if it didn't, but, let's take a look at why and

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how the NRP has managed since 1960 to maintain a record of security which probably has not been surpassed in the history of intelligence and secrecy.

First, it is because of the motivational factors I mentioned earlier. Second, we have always maintained a totally unflappable attitude in the face of these disclosures and inquiries. We have never rushed to let the cat out of the bag just because he managed to get a whisker out of the opening. We have let the disclosures wear themselves out in the press. We have avoided adding to the information that was already compromised. Like any champion team, we have never abandoned our game plan. We have stuck together. We have avoided adding to the problem, and it is important that we continue to do so. When we start letting our adversaries call the shots, when we start playing their game, we are going to be in very serious trouble.

Now, should the government do something about disclosures? Should we have laws to limit the news media? Well, such laws are impossible because they are unconstitutional, and secondly, I for one wouldn't like to see them passed because they would deprive us as Americans of one of our most precious possessions, a free press.

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Security has to come from within, and recent efforts to plug security leaks have concentrated on seeking legislation to penalize those who disclose secrets which were officially entrusted to them. This is logically and legally the only way we can go among the informed and well intentioned government officials.

There is a lack of agreement on certain basics. For example, there are those who feel strongly that the fact that the United States engages in satellite reconnaissance for intelligence purposes, what we popularly call fact of, should be unclassified. And certainly the disclosures by the news media, government officials, and others lend an unassailable logic to the proposition that when everyone knows a secret it isn't a secret any more. But other officials, equally well motivated, contend that we must maintain fact of as a secret, at least officially, because of possible diplomatic and political repercussions of officially acknowledging that we are capable of gathering intelligence from any corner of the earth without the consent of the countries which are being so surveilled. This is a very serious problem and a difficult one, and I don't know how long it's going to take to reach a final decision on it, but it probably will come fairly soon.

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One thing for certain, if we are going to maintain our capabilities, facts about overhead reconnaissance have to be very closely held. Every increment of information about how our systems operate, every item of data on how effective they are, all contribute to the ability of our adversaries to mount effective countermeasures. Unfortunately, there is a link between fact of and facts about. Even people in the intelligence community sometimes ask why all the secrecy. The Russians know we have satellite reconnaissance systems, why can't we save ourselves a lot of money and do away with all these security programs. The naivete' of such a view is really appalling. The Soviet intelligence services are spending a small fortune trying to learn all about our capabilities. If they can learn with precision what our systems can do, how well they do it, they can concentrate their efforts on only those countermeasures which will be really effective against us.

The new social laws such as the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information can provide opportunities for people whose real purpose is to reveal intelligence sources and efforts. Now, I might add parenthetically that the people in the

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Central Intelligence Agency, for example, who are tasked with responding to these Freedom of Information Act inquiries find that not only are there very frequently nebulous reasons for requesting the information - but they find the same phraseology, the same format coming at them from all parts of the country, and this of course adds up to a concerted effort to disrupt and harass the intelligence community.

This kind of legislation, as the least, makes it very difficult to formulate policies which are as simple and effective as the ones in the 60's were. It will become increasingly important to understand why our policies are changing. At the same time, it will be more difficult in a rapidly evolving situation to keep track of the changes which will certainly occur. We are going to have to communicate more closely. You will have to try to foresee complications which will arise from your implementation of those changes in policy.

At this time there are a number of studies of compartmentation going on in the intelligence community. The views expressed in these studies range from favoring complete

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abolition of compartmentation through the realignment of the various categories and criteria for compartmentation, to finally a retention of the status quo. I think of those three the last is the least likely to occur over the long haul.

In addition, the techniques of compartmentation, as they are practiced in the national programs and have been for years, are being copied by departmental programs, and more code words and more slugs and more special channels are being created, which promises additional confusion, criticism of compartmentation today.

The picture I have painted may seem like a bleak one, but I believe we are near the end of a difficult time, one in which security was subordinated to a desire to probably reveal all the ills and bad features of our intelligence effort.

I feel that, in perspective, most Americans are convinced that mistakes have been made, but they were not massive as was charged, and they were not motivated by anything other than a desire to serve the best interests of the United States.

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The former Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, was a man of patriotism, wisdom and foresight. He realized that the day of simply stamping documents with a secret stamp without any really serious consideration of why are over, and he spoke repeatedly in public speaking engagements of the need to keep good secrets while not trying to keep bad secrets. Most of his major addresses heavily stressed the importance to our nation of a strong, well founded security program, and the lessons he taught are vitally important. He pointed out the folly of trying to protect too much, of trying to conceal the unconcealable, if we try to hide things which shouldn't be hidden, which can't be hidden, we damage security by providing ammunition to our critics. We can then say look at what all the bureaucrats with their little rubber stamps have done now. The worst part about that is when we have done something that can truthfully be pointed to in fashion, we have given them ammunition. We have provided credence and it does seriously undermine our efforts to keep the good secrets. The present Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, has already demonstrated a very keen interest in security. He is a tireless worker, he shows every promise of giving strong security leadership in the community. I think that we can be assured that he's not going to do anything to

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weaken his ability to safeguard intelligence sources and methods which is what he's charged to do by statute. The CIA, I believe, is not about to adopt an extremist position that says we have no secrets worth keeping.

Close and continuous communication between those who make and administer policy and those who carry it out is indispensable. Those of us in Washington need to know when policies are being overtaken by events, or when circumstances dictate the need for new policies to cover new situations. All too often in history battles have been lost because the people at headquarters didn't know what was going on in the trenches. So we have got to have that very, very close communication, and it's got to be timely. We can't let the situation sit around and get worse and worse until there isn't any solution possible before we try to do something about it. I believe in the near term we are going to be able to stabilize our security programs, formulate policies that are appropriate to today's situation and get on with the business of producing the world's best intelligence collection systems.

In the long term I believe that if we maintain a rigorous, viable security program, the disclosures which have been made will fade into insignificance, as new secrets arise to

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replace the old ones, just as the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the 1950's have long been public knowledge. The facts about our satellite systems which have been disclosed will fade into history.

It is vitally necessary, however, that we renew our resolve at this moment to make the extra effort that spells the difference between a truly effective security program and simply making a minimal effort to give the appearance of compliance with security policies. Based on the past record, I think I know which one you are going to chose, and I believe the people of the United States owe each of you a debt of gratitude for your dedication over the past two decades. Thank you.

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25X1A Presentation by [] of the NRO
Staff to the 26 May 1976 [] Security Meeting
in Los Angeles. "The NRO in a Changing Environ-
25X1A ment" is [] subject, and he addresses
the impact of Executive Order 11905, The NRO
Charter, National Policy for Satellite Reconnaissance,
and NRO Support to Military Forces.

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25X1A [] remarks have been transcribed and
edited for presentation in this report of proceedings.

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THE NRO IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905

NRO CHARTER


NATIONAL POLICY AND SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

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


(Refer to Chart #1)

There have probably been more changes that affect the intelligence community in the last two years than there were in the past decade. EO 11905, which caused the reorganization of the foreign intelligence collection activities of the US Government, is perhaps the top driving document to all the changes but it's by no means the only driving force that's going on in the community. The NRO Charter, the document which tells how we operate and makes the NRO a formal instrument for collecting intelligence, is perhaps of more concern to those people in the government than in the contractor plants. Based on experience, it is good background for understanding the total picture. I will also elaborate on satellite reconnaissance policy.

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EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HEARINGS
EXECUTIVE ORDER

ABOLISHED USIB IRAC NSCIC NRP EXCOM
40 COMMITTEE

ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP

THE NRO IS A SPECIALIZED RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

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(Refer to Chart #2)

EO 11905 was published on the 18th of February 1976. It was driven by a need to improve the efficiency of the intelligence community and government control over domestic surveillance activities to assure no violation of individual rights. We are caught up in the over-all changes that are taking place in the legislative structure.

We work with the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Generally the comments have been the program is well run and vital.

One of the specific features of the EO that affected the NRP was the abolishment of the USIB. The USIB had been the organization that provided our requirements, both long range and mission by mission, for collecting intelligence.

USIB is being reconstituted as the National Foreign Intelligence Board without any great changes from the former USIB structure.

The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee was also abolished by this order as was the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

The NRP Executive Committee, which has been our Board of Governors over the years, was also abolished. It has been replaced by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

The EO did not call us the "NRO". That would have acknowledged the existence of the office and been one step further to divulging as an official policy of the government that we conduct satellite reconnaissance. At the last moment the White House struck the words. They covered the NRO by saying that there should be specialized reconnaissance offices for the collection of specialized intelligence.

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(REFER TO CHART #3)

Let's start with the DNRO. He is appointed as the DNRO by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the NRP. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence consists of three people: the DCI is the Chairman and the other two members are the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. We look to this Committee on Foreign Intelligence to approve our programs and our budgets. We look to the DCI to establish our requirements and priorities as the Chairman of the NFIB. The DCI is also responsible, based upon the National Security Act of 1947, for establishing the security policy that pertains to our program.

The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is to work with each of the agencies of the intelligence community and look at matters of propriety and legality in their operations. There will be periodic reports, at least quarterly, made to this board.

Matters involving legality of intelligence operations will be reported by the IOB to the Attorney General for presentation to the President. Matters of propriety rather than legality will be reported directly to the President by the IOB. The board is a three member board and is shown overlapping with the President's FIAB. (The FIAB is responsible for many of the management procedures that we operate under now.)

The EO also calls out that each intelligence agency will have an Inspector General (IG). The OSD has never had an IG. We will have to report problems of law and propriety thru this IG who will answer to the Deputy Secretary of Defense directly.

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DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

PROHIBITED WITHOUT ATTORNEY GENERAL APPROVAL

NRP CONDUCTS DOMESTIC R&D AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING TESTS

SIGINT

PHOTO

DOD GENERAL COUNSEL ASKED FOR APPROVAL

1 JUNE 76 COMPLIANCE

ANTICIPATED OUTCOME

DNRO GRANTED AUTHORITY

AUTHORITY REQUIRED FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TEST

DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES REQUIRED

REPORTS REQUIRED FOR INFRACTIONS

EXTREME DISCRETION ESSENTIAL

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(Refer to Chart #4)

Domestic surveillance. E.O. 11905 contains restrictions on Domestic Surveillance. The Attorney General must approve domestic surveillance activities, actual or apparent. In the development of systems we actually do R&D tests and we do systems engineering tests, such as calibrations. We also do work with photo satellites for system performance evaluation which is used in things like validation of contract performance. These activities certainly could give the appearance of domestic surveillance.

We have developed some procedures by which we will be able to get approval to continue necessary R&D activities. We are interested only in those things under our direct control. The date in the E.O. calls for 1 June 1976 compliance. We have completed interim planning documents. There will be modifications to them but we are working under them on an interim basis. We anticipate that the DNRO will be granted the final authority for determination of what activities can and cannot be permitted without going forward for specific AG comment or approval. For each category of test we will require a specific approval. Reports are required for infractions. There's a lot of self-policing required. That's why we have an IG established. I think really the primary point here is that extreme discretion is essential in this whole area.

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NRO CHARTER

1965 AGREEMENT

CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905

STRENGTHENS NRO

CFI DIRECTIVE NO. 3

REAFFIRMS HIGHEST NATIONAL PRIORITY

TASKED BY NFIB (SEC DEF IN WAR)

STAFFS NRP FOR CFI (INTERFACES WITH IC STAFF)

SOLE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL & GENERAL COUNSEL

NRO REMAINS COVERT

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(Refer to Chart #5)

The NRO Charter - Our 1965 agreement is signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is called an agreement for the reorganization of the NRO/NRP. We are [redacted] in the Intelligence Community and one of the least formally chartered. The E.O. does put things in perspective, and we have gone one step further and put together a revised charter - Committee on Foreign Intelligence Directive #3. We have general agreement on the provisions of this charter and we do consider that E.O. 11905 serves to strengthen the NRO.

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New feature - historically we have never had any provision for transitioning control or tasking in time of war and that feature will now be included in our charter. It will say, in time of crises, war, or when directed by the President, the control for the tasking of reconnaissance satellites will revert to the Secretary of Defense.

An important point - we are still the sole agency of the US Government responsible for satellite intelligence collection activities. The NRO is still the sole agency responsible for studies, development and operation of reconnaissance satellites.

And finally, the NRO remains by charter a covert organization. There is a line in the charter which has not changed in any of the staffing saying that only with the approval or recommendation of the DCI to the President will there be any change in the covert nature of the organization. "Fact of" satellite reconnaissance has still not been acknowledged.

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LET'S TALK ABOUT SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

- DCI POSITIONS - PAST & PRESENT
- DR. PROCTOR'S COMMITTEE
- SELF HEALING PHILOSOPHY
- DOD PREPARED TO SAY --
- THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS
 - "EVERYBODY KNOWS"
 - EFFECTS OF TIME
 - NUMBERS OF PEOPLE
 - IRREVERSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE
 - TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
- THE PRESS
- PHOTINT VS SIGINT
- SPACE POLICY COMMITTEE

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(REFER TO CHART #6)

Satellite reconnaissance is one of the best protected programs in the intelligence business. Mr. Bush has informally reaffirmed that he does not want "fact of" acknowledged; however, that position is not final. Regarding information in the media, we have always had a self-healing philosophy that you neither confirm nor deny what has been divulged, accurate or not. If a decision is made to acknowledge, for example, at the confidential level, you don't make any further acknowledgments. That message may get lost by the time it gets to the field. People don't have an in-depth knowledge of what national policy is in this area or of what's really intended by such an acknowledgment. Having seen some official proclamation that we do satellite reconnaissance, people, without the specific policy background, may then feel free to go ahead and say even more. That concerns us very much.

I have to point out that if the DOD is asked if there is an NRO, they are prepared to say: "Yes, there is an NRO; any further details are classified." That announcement can only come from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Don't react to questions or announcements in this area until you hear from us.

Without reconnaissance satellites we'd be totally blinded as to the military strength of the Soviet Union and China. Because of this, more and more people have known about it. The process is an irreversible one. Numbers of people who use both the product and have access to the programmatic aspects of the [] system have grown significantly. These people don't forget what they have learned. They quite often see better or additional applications that can be made, still within security bounds and the national interest. It is a much wider body of knowledge now than it used to be.

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If the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance is acknowledged, that means photographic reconnaissance. That would soon erode and people would start talking about the sigint missions.

Finally, a bright note on the "fact of" issue - the Space Policy Committee. Recently the principals of this committee met and the major conclusion was that the US government should not acknowledge the fact that we conduct satellite reconnaissance operations. This position was conveyed to the DCI.

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IN CONCLUSION

THE NRO IS VIABLE

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE IS A SECRET

THERE WILL BE GREATER INTERFACE
WITH MILITARY USERS


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(REFER TO CHART #7)

In conclusion, the NRO controls reconnaissance satellites. It is still the policy of the US government that satellite reconnaissance is a secret. It is not in the best national interest to divulge "fact of"; that could cause adverse political reaction which we would not want to suffer at this time. Finally, the thrust of the future is that there will be better use, greater use, wider use of the product of our satellites.

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